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A DOUBLE DUE PROCESS DENIAL: THE CRIME OF
PROVIDING MATERIAL SUPPORT OR RESOURCES TO
DESIGNATED FOREIGN TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS
RANDOLPH

N. JONAKAIT*

The Anti-Terrorist and Effective Death Penalty Act, passed in
1996, criminalized the act of providing material support or resources to foreign terrorist organizations. Before September 11,
there were only three prosecutions for this crime.' Since then prosecutions have increased and likely will continue to increase. The
criminalizing statute, Section 2339B, 2 creates a major prosecutorial
tool in the fight against terrorism. Section 2339B, however, raises
troubling due process issues - it works a double due process denial.
An essential element of a Section 2339B prosecution is that a particular group has been designated a foreign terrorist organization by
the Secretary of State. Yet the statute's designation procedure does
not provide notice and a hearing to the organization, and that violates the rights of an organization entitled to due process. The defendant in a Section 2339B prosecution is prohibited from
challenging the validity of the designation, and this prohibition,
too, denies due process.
This article contends that when an organization is designated a
foreign terrorist organization in violation of due process, that designation is unconstitutional. A Section 2339B prosecution based on
an unconstitutional designation is unconstitutional. This article
concludes that the accused in a Section 2339B prosecution is entitled to judicial review of the constitutionality of a designation. This
article proposes that the statutory scheme be changed to avoid
these problems by affording organizations notice of an imminent
designation and a meaningful hearing to contest a designation.
*
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(2002) ("[Als of December 2001, the government had prosecuted only three cases involving material support to terrorist organizations.").

2.

18 U.S.C. § 2339B (2003).
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Part I sets out the statutory scheme for Section 2339B prosecutions. Part II explores judicial interpretations of that statutory
scheme. Part III explores the due process rights of an organization
and how a designation may violate those rights. Part IV explains
how in a Section 2339B proceeding the accused's constitutional
rights are violated when a prosecution is based on a designation
made in violation of due process. Part V proposes remedies for the
constitutional problems.
I.

THE STATUTORY SCHEME

A.

Section 2339B

The basic criminalizing provision of the statute states: "Whoever, within the United States or subject to the jurisdiction of the
United States, knowingly provides material support or resources to
a foreign terrorist organization, or attempts or conspires to do so,
shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 15
years, or both, and, if the death of any person results, shall be imprisoned for any term of years or for life."'3 The statute does not list
nor define the proscribed organizations. Instead, it states that a
terrorist organization is an "organization designated as a terrorist
organization under Section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality
Act,"' 4 codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1189 ["Section 1189"].
B.

The Designation Process

The Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of the
Treasury and the Attorney General, is authorized by Section 1189
to designate a group as a foreign terrorist organization if the Secretary finds that the group is foreign, engages in or has the capacity
or intent to engage in terrorist activity, and "threatens the security
3.
18 U.S.C. § 2239B(a) (1). "Material support or resources" is broadly defined to
include "currency or monetary instruments or financial securities, financial services,
lodging, training, expert advice or assistance, safehouses, false documentation or identification, communications equipment, facilities, weapons, lethal substances, explosives,
personnel, transportation, and other physical assets, except medicine or religious
materials." 18 U.S.C. § 2239A.
4. 18 U.S.C. § 2239B(g) (6).
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of the United States nationals or the national security of the United
5

States."

5. 8 U.S.C. § 1189(a)(1) (2003). The statute broadly defines "national security"
as "the national defense, foreign relations, or economic interests of the United
States. . . ." 8 U.S.C. § 1189(c)(2).
Section 1189 incorporates two definitions of "engages in terrorist activity." One is
limited to violent action and states that " 'terrorism' means premeditated, politically
motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or
clandestine agents." 22 U.S.C. § 2656f(d)(2) (2003). The second definition is more
expansive. It first states that a "terrorist activity" is an act illegal where committed or
under United States law if committed here and involves any of the following:
(I) The highjacking of any conveyance....
(II) The seizing or detaining, and threatening to kill, injure, or continue to
detain, another individual in order to compel a third person (including a
governmental organization) to do or abstain from doing any act as an explicit or implicit condition for the release of the individual seized or
detained.
(III) A violent attack upon an internationally protected person (as defined
in section 1116(b) (4)) or upon the liberty of such a person.
(IV) An assassination.
(V) The use of any(a) biological agent, chemical agent, or nuclear weapon or device, or
(b) explosive, firearm, or other weapon or dangerous device (other
than for mere personal monetary gain), with intent to endanger, directly or indirectly, the safety of one or more individuals or to cause
substantial damage to property.
(VI) A threat, attempt, or conspiracy to do any of the foregoing.
8 U.S.C § 1182(a)(3)(B)(iii) (2003).
The statute then states:
As used in this chapter, the term "engage in terrorist activity" means, in
an individual capacity or as a member of an organization(I) to commit or to incite to commit, under circumstances indicating an
intention to cause death or serious bodily injury, a terrorist activity;
(II) to prepare or plan a terrorist activity;
(III) to gather information on potential targets for terrorist activity;
(IV) to solicit funds or other things of value for(aa) a terrorist activity;
(bb) a terrorist organization described in clause (vi) (I) or (vi) (II) [organizations designated by the Secretary of State under Section 1189 or
otherwise designated by the Secretary as terrorist organizations]; or
(cc) a terrorist organization described in clause (vi) (III) [a group of
two or more who engage in the activities set forth in (I), (II), or (III)
above]
(V) to solicit any individual(aa) to engage in conduct otherwise described in this clause;
(bb) for membership in a terrorist organization described in clause
(vi)(I) or (vi)(I1); or
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Before making the designation, the Secretary of State must
confidentially inform the leaders of Congress of the intent to designate a group as a foreign terrorist organization and the reasons for
the proposed action. 6 The designation takes effect seven days after
this communication when it is published in the Federal Register. In
making a designation, the Secretary must create an administrative
record and may consider classified information. 7 The classified information is not to be disclosed except to the reviewing court ex
parte and in camera." An organization is not given notice of an
impending designation and not given a hearing or other opportunity to present any information before a designation is made.

(cc) for membership in a terrorist organization described in clause
(vi) (III), unless the solicitor can demonstrate that he did not know,
and should not reasonably have known, that the solicitation would
further the organization's terrorist activity; or
(VI) to commit an act that the actors knows, or reasonably should know,
affords material support, including a safe house, transportation, communications, funds, transfer of funds or other material financial benefit, false
documentation or identification, weapons (including chemical, biological,
or radiological weapons), explosives, or training(aa) for the commission of a terrorist activity;
(bb) to any individual who the actor knows, or reasonably should
know, has committed or plans to commit a terrorist activity;
(cc) to a terrorist organization described in clause (vi) (I) or (vi) (I1);
or to a terrorist organization; or
(dd) to a terrorist organization described in clause (vi) (II1), unless
the actor can demonstrate that he did not know, and should not reasonably have known, that the act would further the organization's terrorist activity.
8 U.S.C. § 1182(a) (3) (B) (iv).
Terrorist activity includes politically-motivated violence aimed at noncombatants,
but also includes a broad range of criminal conduct, such as highjacking and kidnaping, that does not necessarily have to have a political motive.
6. 8 U.S.C. § 1189(a) (2) (A) states, "Seven days before making a designation
under this subsection, the Secretary shall, by classified communication, notify the
Speaker and the Minority Leader of the House of Representatives, the President pro
tempore, Majority Leader, and Minority Leader of the Senate, and the members of the
relevant committees of the House of Representatives and the Senate, in writing, of the
intent to designate an organization under this subsection, together with the findings
made under paragraph (1) with respect to that organization, and the factual basis
therefor."
7. 8 U.S.C. § 1189(a) (3).
8. Id.
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Congress has the power to override the designation, 9 and the
Secretary of State can find that changed circumstances support the
designation's revocation. 10 Otherwise the classification lasts for two
years, when a group can be redesignated a foreign terrorist organi-

zation for subsequent two-year terms term without limitation on the
number of possible redesignations. 11
C. Judicial Review of the Designation
A designated organizationmay seek judicial review of the designation in the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit but must do so no later than thirty days after the
designation is published in the Federal Register. 12 The organization may not submit any information to the reviewing court. The
reviewing court is limited to considering the administrative record
13
and any classified material submitted to it by the government.
The classified information is not disclosed to the organization, but
considered by the court ex parte and in camera. The court may set
aside the designation only if the Secretary acted unconstitutionally,
illegally, or arbitrarily in making the designation or the designation
does not have substantial support in the administrative record or
classified information.1 4 While a designated organization is permitted this limited judicial review of the designation, a person charged
9. 8 U.S.C. § 1189(a)(2)(B)(ii) states: "Any designation under this subsection
shall cease to have effect upon an Act of Congress disapproving such designation."
10. 8 U.S.C. § 1189(a) (6) (A) states: "The Secretary may revoke a designation (1)
or redesignation made under paragraph (4) (B) if the Secretary finds that - - (i) the
circumstances that were the basis for the designation or redesignation have changed in
such a manner as to warrant revocation; or (ii) the national security of the United
States warrants a revocation."
11. 8 U.S.C. § 1189(a)(4).
12. 8 U.S.C. § 1189(b)(1).
13. 8 U.S.C. § 1189(a) (3) (B).
14. 8 U.S.C. § 1189(b) (3) states: "The Court shall hold unlawful and set aside a
designation the Court finds to be- (A) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or
otherwise not in accordance with law; (B) contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege, or immunity; (C) in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitation, or
short of statutory right; (D) lacking substantial support in the administrative record
taken as a whole or in classified information submitted to the court under paragraph
(2), or (E) not in accord with the procedures required by law."
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under Section 2339B is prohibited from challenging the legality of
15
the designation.
II.

JUDICIAL CONSTRUCTION OF THE STATUTORY PROVISIONS

A.

Due Process for a Designated Organization

The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia concluded
in People's Mojahedin Organization of Iran v. Department of State that
the procedures for designating an organization as a foreign terrorist organization under Section 1189 violate due process if the or6
ganization had a presence in the United States when designated.'
The Secretary of State designated the People's Mojahedin Organization of Iran (PMOI) and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Elam
(LTTE) foreign terrorist organizations. The PMOI and the LTTE
soughtjudicial review claiming that the designation procedures violated due process. The court concluded that "[a] foreign entity
without property or presence in this country has no constitutional
rights under the due process clause." 17 Because the PMOI and the
LTTE claimed no presence in the United States when designated,
they were not entitled to due process. The organizations could only
rely on the rights given in the designation statute, and those, the
court held, had been satisfied.
After the first designation period, the Secretary of State
redesignated the PMOI as a foreign terrorist organization and also
designated the National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI) as an
alias for the PMOI. The organizations sought judicial review claiming a due process violation. The D.C. Circuit agreed in National
Council of Resistance of Iran v. Department of State.18
Evidence now showed that the organizations were present in
the United States when designated. The government conceded
that NCRI had a space in a Washington office building and an interest in an American bank account. Furthermore, the court's review of the record including classified information confirmed that
NCRI had a substantial presence in the country. The court con15.
16.
17.
18.

8 U.S.C. § 1189(a)(8).
182 F.3d 17 (1999).
Id. at 22.
251 F.3d 192 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
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cluded that these connections to the country entitled the organizations to due process. 19
The court then held that the designation as a foreign terrorist
organization deprived the organization of liberty and property
within the meaning of the due process clause. The designation statute empowers the Secretary of Treasury to order all United States
financial institutions possessing or controlling any of the organization's assets to block any financial transactions by a designated organization before the designation is even published in the Federal
Register. 20 In addition, a designation means that the organization's
fundraising in the United States has been outlawed, for anyone
under American jurisdiction who gives resources to the organization is committing a crime. The designation, thus, strips an organization of bank accounts and the ability to raise or receive resources
from anyone within the jurisdiction of the United States and, consequently, the court concluded, deprives the organization of a constitutionally protected liberty and property.
The court then stated, "[T]he fundamental norm of the due
process clause jurisprudence requires that before the government
can constitutionally deprive a person of the protected liberty or
property interest, it must afford him notice and hearing." 21 The
designation statute, however, does not provide for notice to an organization that a designation is being considered by the govern19. The PMOI had not asserted a presence in the country, but the court found
that it, too, was entitled to due process because "the United States is now hoist with its
own petard. The Secretary concluded in her designation, which we upheld for the
reasons set forth above, that the NCRI and the PMOI are one. The NCRI is present in
the United States. If A is B, and B is present, then A is present also." 251 F.3d at 202.
Cf 32 County Sovereignty Committee v. Department of State, 292 F.3d 797 (D.C. Cir.
2002), upholding the designations of foreign terrorist organizations where members of
the organizations had a presence in the United States, but the organizations had
neither a presence nor a property interest in the country. The court concluded, "The
Secretary therefore did not have to provide [the designated organizations] with any
particular process before designating them as foreign terrorist organizations." Id. at
799.
20. 8 U.S.C. § 1189(C) provides: "Upon notification under paragraph (2)(A)(i),
the Secretary of the Treasury may require United States financial institutions possessing
or controlling any assets included in the notification to block all financial transactions
involving those assets until further directive from either the Secretary of the Treasury,
Act of Congress, or order of court." The notification referred to is the notice given to
the congressional leaders. 8 U.S.C. § 1189(2) (A) (ii).
21. 251 F.3d at 205.
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ment and provides for no hearing before the designation. It does
provide for judicial review by the D.C. Circuit after a designation,
but the court concluded that this review does not afford a hearing
that satisfies due process. First, the review comes subsequent to the
designation when liberty has already been deprived. Furthermore,
the judicial review is limited to the administrative record and classified information submitted by the government to the court with no
opportunity for the organization to present any information about
the propriety of a designation. The court noted that "[t] he unique
feature of this statutory procedure is the dearth of procedural participation and protection afforded the designated entity. At no
point in the proceedings establishing the administrative record is
the alleged terrorist organization afforded notice of the materials
used against it, or a right to comment on such materials or the developing administrative record." 2 2 The court then held that because a designated organization is not given notice and a
meaningful opportunity to be heard, the designation of an organization entitled to due process violates due process. The court
stated further that due process for such an organization would normally be satisfied if the Secretary of State gives notice to entities of a
pending designation, 23 discloses the unclassified information upon
22. 251 F.3d at 196. Earlier, the D.C. Circuit had noted about Section 1189: "The
statute before us is unique, procedurally and substantively." People's Mojahedin Organization of Iran v. Department of State, 182 F.3d 17, 19 (1999). While the court's
duty to review "findings" on an "administrative record" looked like a usual task for the
court, the situation under this designation procedure was different: "But unlike the
run-of-the-mill administrative proceeding, here there is no adversary hearing, no presentation of what courts and agencies think of as evidence, no advance notice to the
entity affected by the Secretary's internal deliberations .... Because nothing in the
legislation restricts the Secretary from acting on the basis of third hand accounts, press
stories, material on the Internet or other hearsay regarding the organization's activities,
the 'administrative record' may consist of little else." Id. The court then stated:
At this point in a judicial opinion, appellate courts often lay out the "facts."
We will not, cannot, do so in these cases. What follows in the next two
subsections may or may not be facts. The information recited is certainly
not evidence of the sort that would normally be received in court. It is
instead material the Secretary of State compiled as a record, from sources
named and unnamed, the accuracy of which we have no way of evaluating.
Id.
23. The court, however, added: "Upon an adequate showing to the court, the Secretary of State may provide this notice after the designation where earlier notification
would impinge upon the security and other foreign policy goals of the United States."
251 F.3d at 208.
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which the government is relying, and provides the organizations
with "the opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a
meaningful opportunity," which shall at least include the opportunity to present evidence that the groups are not foreign terrorist
organizations.

24

The Secretary of State redesignated the PMOI as a foreign terrorist group. But this time, however, the Secretary gave notice and
a hearing as mandated by the D.C. Circuit. PMOI then claimed
that the ex parte use of the classified information deprived it of a
meaningful opportunity to be heard and, thus, due process. The
court labeled this claim "colorable" 2 5 but rejected it because the
separation of powers created by the Constitution gives control of
classified information to the executive. 26 Furthermore, the court
24.
251 F.3d at 209. Because the designation would expire four months from its
decision, the court stated that it was not vacating the designation but would "remand
the questions to the Secretary with instructions that the petitioners be afforded the
opportunity to file responses to the nonclassified evidence against them, to file evidence in support of their allegations that they are not terrorist organizations, and that
they be afforded an opportunity to be meaningfully heard by the Secretary upon the
relevant findings." Id.
Cf Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Development v. Ashcroft, 219 F. Supp. 2d
57 (D.D.C. 2002). Pursuant to authority under the International Emergency Economic
Powers Act (IEEPA), 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701-07, as amended by the USA Patriot Act, 115 Stat.
272 (Oct. 26, 2001), the President declared a national emergency and the Department
of the Treasury designated the Holy Land Foundation a "Specially Designated Terrorist
Organization," an action which froze their United States assets. Relying on National
Council of Resistance of Iran v. Department of State, 251 F.3d 192 (D.C. Cir. 2001), the Holy
Land Foundation claimed a due process violation because it had not been given notice
or a meaningful opportunity to be heard before the assets were blocked. The court
concluded that the D.C. Circuit case did not control because under the IEEPA the
action required a Presidentially declared national emergency, and due process in emergency situations is satisfied with notice and a hearing after the seizure of property. Id.
at 16. See also Global Relief Foundation, Inc. v. O'Neill, 315 F.2d 748 (7th Cir. 2002)
(where assets were also blocked under the IEEPA). The Seventh Circuit concluded,
"[Tihe Constitution [does not] entitle GRF to notice and a pre-seizure hearing, an
opportunity that would allow any enemy to spirit assets out of the United States. Although pre-seizure hearing is the constitutional norm, postponement is acceptable in
emergencies." Id. at 754.
25. People's Mojahedin Organization of Iran v. Department of State, 327 F.3d
1238, 1242 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
26. "[U]nder the separation of powers created by the United States Constitution,
the Executive Branch has control and responsibility over access to classified information and has 'compelling interest' in withholding national security information from
unauthorized persons in the course of executive business." Id. (quoting Dep't of the
Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 527 (1988) (citations omitted)).
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noted that due process depends on the particular circumstances of
a case, 2 7 which here involved "the sensitive matter of classified information in the effort to combat foreign terrorism;" due process
did not require disclosure of the classified material. 28 Because the
Secretary had given the PMOI an opportunity to respond to the
unclassified material, due process was satisfied. The court concluded that the presented record supported the Secretary of State's
designation and, therefore, the designation was valid. In so holding, the court indicated that even though Section 1189 does not
require notice and a hearing, if the Secretary affords them, a designation will not violate due process.
B. Due Processfor the Defendant in a Section 2339B Prosecution
Merely giving material support or resources to a terrorist group
is not a crime under Section 2339B. A donation is prohibited only
if it goes to an organization that has been designated by the Secretary of State. Therefore, the Secretary's designation is an essential
element of a Section 2339B prosecution. If Section 1189's procedures are followed, no notice or hearing is given. Thus, if the D.C.
Circuit's due process analysis is correct, an essential element of a
Section 2339B prosecution may be created in violation of the
Constitution.
Defendants charged with violating Section 2339B have claimed
that their prosecutions violate due process if the designation of the
foreign terrorist organization was made in violation of due process.
27. "The Due Process Clause requires only that process which is due under the
circumstances of the case." 327 F.3d at 1242.
28. Id. at 1242-43. The court continued that even if its assessment of due process
was wrong, the error was harmless because the nonclassified information that was disclosed supported the Secretary's designation. Id. at 1243. See also Global Relief Foundation, Inc. v. O'Neill, 315 F.3d 748 (7th Cir. 2002). Pursuant to authority under the
International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701-07, as
amended by the USA PatriotAct, 115 Stat. 272 (Oct. 26, 2001), the President declared a
national emergency and the Department of the Treasury designated Global Relief
Foundation a "Specially Designated Terrorist Organization," an action which froze the
Foundation's assets in the United States. The Seventh Circuit concluded, "Administration of the IEEPA is not rendered unconstitutional because that statute authorizes the
use of classified information that may be considered ex parte by the district court....
The Constitution would indeed be a suicide pact... if the only way to curtail enemies'
access to assets were to reveal information that might cost lives." Id. at 754.
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Trial courts have just begun to confront this issue and have produced different conclusions about it.
The defendants in United States v. Rahmani2 9 were indicted in
the Central District of California for providing material resources to
the Mujahedin-e Khalq (MEK). The Secretary of State had designated MEK a foreign terrorist organization as an alias for the NCRI,
and the D.C. Circuit had ruled, as we have seen, that one designation of NCRI had violated due process, 30 but that a later designation satisfied due process and was valid. 3 1 The defendants
contended that because the designation procedures of Section
1189 violate due process, the NCRI's designation could not be used
in a Section 2339B prosecution.
The government responded that a district court can not decide
Section 1189's constitutionality in a criminal case because Section
1189 only authorizes judicial review in the D.C. Circuit, and expressly forbids criminal defendants from challenging the validity of
a designation. 32 The court rejected this contention, reasoning that
"[b]efore a statute will be construed to restrict access to judicial
review there must be clear and convincing evidence of Congressional intent to impose such a restriction ....

This language does

not evince a clear and convincing congressional intent to foreclose
judicial review of a designation by other federal courts and, therefore, does not make the D.C. Circuit the sole arbiter of Section
1189's constitutionality." 33 Furthermore, District Judge Takasugi
continued, the restriction on review in a criminal case improperly
circumscribes judicial duties: "As a district judge I am duty bound
to scrutinize the laws applied in my court for conformance with the
Constitution .... I will not abdicate my responsibilities as a district
judge and turn a blind eye to the constitutional infirmities of Sec29. 209 F. Supp. 2d 1045 (C.D. Cal. 2002).
30. National Council of Resistance of Iran v. Department of State, 251 F.3d 192
(D.C. Cir. 2001).
31. People's Mojahedin Organization of Iran v. Department of State, 327 F.3d
1238 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
32. "The government avers that if the D.C. Circuit or the Supreme Court struck
down Section 1189 as unconstitutional defendants would then be entitled to raise this
defense in instant motion to dismiss. The government is essentially saying that this
court is without power to review the constitutionality of Section 1189." 209 F. Supp. 2d
at 1053.
33. Id. at 1053.
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tion 1189 when it supplies a necessary predicate to the charged offense." 34 Finally, the court concluded that "Section 1189 violates
the defendants' due process rights because defendants, upon a successful Section 2339B prosecution, are deprived of their liberty
based on an unconstitutional designation they could never challenge. Accordingly... defendants may raise the constitutionality of
Section 1189 as a defense.. .. -35
Rahmani held, however, that the criminal defendants could not
prevail simply because the D.C. Circuit had held that one of the
alter egos of the MEK had been denied due process. Defendants in
a criminal case, the Rahmani court concluded, must show prejudice
from a due process violation in order to prevail, and these defen36
dants could not show prejudice.
Rahmani then sharply veered from the D.C. Circuit's analysis of
Section 1189 and found the designation statute unconstitutional on
its face. The court recognized that a law can be facially unconstitutional only if it is invalid under all circumstances and that any con37
stitutional application of the statute defeats the facial challenge.
The prosecution argued that the facial challenge to the statute had
to fail because the D.C. Circuit had upheld designations, indicating
that the statute could be constitutionally applied. Rahmani, however, concluded that People's Mojahedin Organizationof Iran v. Department of State38 had upheld the designations not because the
procedures were constitutional but only because the organizations
were not entitled to due process. In Judge Takasugi's reading, the
D.C. Circuit could not have ruled that the designation procedures
satisfied due process because such a constitutional ruling would
have violated the justiciability requirements of standing and the
prohibition against advisory opinions. Moreover, Section 1189
"should not be immune from facial attack simply because it can be
34. 209 F. Supp. 2d at 1054.
35. Id. at 1054-55.
36. "Prejudice requires a showing of a reasonable probability that, but for the due
process violation, the result of the proceeding would have been different ....
Here, no
prejudice could have inured to the NCRI because the same result obtained after the
due process defects were purportedly cured. Since no prejudice inured to the NCRI,
defendants cannot prove the [necessary] prejudice.. . ." Id. at 1055.
37. See id. ("the challenger must establish that no set of circumstances exists
under which the statute would be valid").
38. 182 F.3d 17 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
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applied to an entity that does not enjoy constitutional rights. If
such were the case, no statute would fall to a facial challenge because the statute could always be applied to a person or entity unto
whom the statute works no constitutional violation." 39 In this view,
PMOI was decided only on standing and said nothing about
constitutionality.
The D.C. Circuit had also held that an organization with a presence in the United States and entitled to due process was validly
designated after being afforded the notice and hearing the court
prescribed. 40 In Rahmani, the government argued that this construction by the court of appeals yielded a constitutional application of Section 1189; consequently, it argued, the designation
procedures could not be facially unconstitutional. Rahmani, however, rejected the D.C. Circuit's interpretation and stated that a notice and hearing requirement could not be read into Section 1189.
Further, the court noted that while statutes should be construed to
avoid constitutional problems, reading a notice and hearing requirement into the statute was not simply a matter of statutory in41
terpretation but "impermissible judicial legislation."
Agreeing with the D.C. Circuit Judge Takasugi stated that noand
a meaningful opportunity to be heard are essential to due
tice
process. The court then held that because Section 1189 does not
afford organizations these basic rights, it denies them due process
in all situations and is facially invalid. 4 2 The court concluded that
"a designation pursuant to Section 1189 is a nullity since it is the
product of an unconstitutional statute . . . and cannot be relied

upon in a prosecution under Section 2339B. ''4 3 If this reasoning
were correct, all Section 2339B prosecutions are unconstitutional.
In United States v. Sattar,Judge Koeltl of the Southern District
44
of New York expressly rejected the Rahmani court's reasoning.
39. 209 F. Supp. 2d at 1056.
40. People's Mojahedin Organization of Iran v. Department of State, 327 F.3d
1238 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
41. "If I were to accept the government's 'construction' argument, I would obliterate any distinction between a facial and as applied challenge to a statute. A court faced
with a facially unconstitutional statute could simply 'construe' non-existent provisions
into a statute to save it from unconstitutionality." 209 F.Supp. 2d at 1057.
42. Id. at 1058.
43. Id. at 1058-59.
44. 272 F. Supp. 2d 348 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
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The charges against the defendants in United States v. Sattar included conspiring to provide and providing material resources to
the Islamic Group (IG), which had been designated a foreign terrorist organization. Among other arguments, the defendants urged
the court to follow Rahmani and dismiss the Section 2339B counts
"on the ground that the Indictment relies on a designation obtained in violation of due process." 45 Judge Koelti stated that
46
"Rahmani is not binding.., and is unpersuasive."
Sattar stressed that Section 1189 prohibited review of the propriety of a designation in the criminal case. Furthermore, the court
stated that the defendants lacked standing to raise the constitutional rights of another, the IG, which is what they were trying to
do, 4 7 and the statutory prohibition on judicial review of a designation in a criminal case did not violate the defendants' right to due
process because the issue in the criminal case is nothing more than
whether an organization has been designated: "The element of the
offense is the designation of IG as an FFO [a foreign terrorist organization], not the correctness of the determination, and the Government would be required to prove at trial that IG was in fact
designated as an FT0 .... The correctness of the designation itself
is not an element of the offense and therefore the defendants' right
to due process is not violated by their inability to challenge the factual correctness of that determination. 48
This disagreement among courts regarding the due process
provided by the statutory scheme has left due process questions
open. The D.C. Circuit, authorized by Section 1189 to review designations, has held that the designation statute as written violates the
due process rights of organizations with a presence in the United
States by not giving them notice of an impending designation and a
hearing to contest the designation. That court, however, has also
indicated that a notice-and-hearing requirement can be read into
45. Id. at 363.
46. Id. at 364.
47. "[T]he Government argues correctly that it is for IG, not the defendants, to
raise IG's due process concerns before a court as provided for under the statute. Litigants, including the defendants, 'never have standing to challenge a statute solely on
the ground that it failed to provide due process to third parties not before the court.'"
272 F. Supp. 2d at 364 (quoting Center for Reproductive Law and Policy v. Bush, 304
F.3d 183, 196 (2d Cir. 2002)).
48. Id. at 367-68.
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the procedures for organizations with a United States presence, and
if the Secretary meets those requirements, designations satisfy due
process. That court has also upheld designations of organizations
without an American presence. The D.C. Circuit cases indicate that
some, but not all, Section 2339B prosecutions might be based on an
essential element, the designation, that had been created in violation of due process. The D.C. Circuit, however, has not addressed
how an unconstitutional designation should affect a criminal case.
Rahmani, on the other hand, found that the designation procedures as enacted always deny due process and that a notice-andhearing requirement cannot be read into the statute. If this were
correct, all designations are unconstitutional, and all Section 2339B
prosecutions are based on an element that has been unconstitutionally created. Rahmani continued that even though the designation
statute prohibits a criminal defendant from raising any questions
about the validity of the designation, defendants could successfully
raise as a defense to a criminal prosecution that the designation
had been made in violation of due process.
Sattarsaid nothing about when, if ever, the designation procedures violate due process. A criminal defendant can merely litigate
whether the Secretary of State had designated an organization, not
whether the Secretary violated due process in making a designation. The statute states that only the D.C. Circuit can rule on
whether a designation has violated due process, and then it can do
so only when it has been challenged by a designated organization.
Sattar did not explicitly state what should happen in a Section
2339B prosecution if the designation were successfully challenged
by the organization, but Sattar indicates that if it is not challenged,
it can be used as an essential element in a Section 2339B
prosecution.
Taken together, these cases raise a number of interrelated issues. Do the designation procedures violate due process? If so, do
designations always violate due process or only sometimes? If the
designation procedure violated due process, can it be used as an
essential element in a Section 2339B prosecution? If such a designation cannot be used as an essential element, can review of the
constitutionality of an element's creation be prohibited in the criminal case?
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To satisfy due process, an organization must be afforded an
opportunity for a meaningful hearing to contest the designation
and notice of an impending designation. Organizations without a
presence in the United States, however, are not entitled to due process and can be validly designated with the statutorily-prescribed
procedures. Whether a notice-and-hearing can be read into the
statutory scheme for the designation organizations entitled to due
process is unclear.
A.

The Notice and HearingRequirement

Organizations entitled to due process are clearly denied that
constitutional right if they are not afforded notice of an imminent
designation and a meaningful opportunity to be heard. The designation deprives the organization of a property interest, and the
Fifth Amendment commands that no one be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. While due process is a
flexible concept, 4 9 its procedural core is clear. "The fundamental
requirement of due process is the opportunity to be heard 'at a
meaningful time and in a meaningful manner."' 50 Notice of the
government's proposed action is necessary for a meaningful hearing, and due process also requires notice. 51 The procedures for
designating a foreign terrorist organization, however, do not give
the organization notice of the impending designation and do not
provide for any kind of hearing before the designation. The statutorily-authorized designation procedures do not afford due process to
organizations entitled to that constitutional right.
B. Due Process for an Organization Without a United States Presence
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia concluded
that an organization with a presence in the United States could not
49. See Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972) ( "It has been said so often
by this Court and others as not to require citation of authority that due process is flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the particular situation demands.").
50. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976) (quoting Armstrong v. Manzo,
380 U.S. 545, 522 (1965)).
51.
See LaChance v. Erickson, 522 U.S. 262, 266 (1998). ("The core of due process
is the right to notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard.").
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be validly designated without notice and a hearing, 52 but that other
organizations could be. 53 Rahmani, however concluded that while

totally foreign groups may not have standing to raise the due process claim, due process requires that all organizations, including
those without a United States presence, be given notice and a hear54
ing before a designation.
Although the Supreme Court has not ruled on the designation
procedures, Court cases from a related area, the exclusion of aliens
from the country, indicate that Rahmani is wrong. Aliens without a
presence in the United States indeed do not have standing to raise
a due process claim, but the actions taken against such aliens, even
if the actions would have violated the Fifth Amendment if taken
against someone with due process rights, are perfectly valid. Such
aliens are due no particular constitutional process, and because
they are not, they are not denied due process even if they had
standing to bring a Fifth Amendment claim.
Thus, aliens who have established a presence in the country
can be deported only if due process, including notice and a meaningful hearing, is afforded. 5 5 On the other hand, an alien first seeking admission to the country has no due process rights. 56 Such an
52. National Council of Resistance of Iran v. Department of State, 251 F.3d 192,
201-02 (D.C. Cir. 2001). See also Russian Volunteer Fleet v. United States, 282 U.S. 481
(1931) (foreign corporation that had property in the United States seized through eminent domain entitled to protection of Fifth Amendment).
53. "A foreign entity without property or presence in this country has no constitutional rights under the due process clause." People's Mojahedin Organization of Iran v.
Department of State, 182 F.2d 17, 22 (D.C. Cir. 1999). See, e.g., United States v.
Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 268 (1990) ("[W]e have rejected the claim that aliens
are entitled to Fifth Amendment rights outside the sovereign territory of the United
States.").
54. See 209 F. Supp. 2d at 1056-58.
55.
See, e.g., Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding, 344 U.S. 590, 596-98 (1953):
It is well established that if an alien is a lawful permanent resident of the
United States and remains physically present there, he is a person with the
protection of the Fifth Amendment. He many not be deprived of his life,
liberty or property without due process of law. Although it later may be
established.., that [an alien] can be expelled and deported, yet before his
expulsion, he is entitled to notice of the nature of the charge and a hearing
at least before an executive or administrative tribunal. Although Congress
may prescribe conditions for the expulsion and deportation, not even Congress may expel him without allowing him a fair opportunity to be heard.
56. See, e.g., Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 32 (1982) ("This Court has long
held that an alien seeking initial admission to the United States requests a privilege
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alien does not have standing to raise a due process challenge, 57 but
this is not simply a matter of standing. Instead, as the Supreme
Court has made clear, "[t]he exclusion of aliens is a fundamental
act of sovereignty. The right to do so stems not alone from legislative power but is inherent in the executive power to control the
foreign affairs of the nation. '5 8 Although Congress may give the
executive the power to exclude without affording the alien notice
or an opportunity to be heard, due process has been satisfied because "[w]hatever the procedure authorized by Congress is, it is
due process as far as an alien denied entry is concerned. '59 The
alien may not have standing to raise a due process claim, 60 but even

regarding his application, for the power to admit or exclude aliens is a sovereign
right."); accord Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651, 659-60 (1892).
57. See, e.g., Allende v. Schultz, 845 F.2d 1111, 1114 n.4 (1st Cir. 1988) (where the
court stated, "Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753 (1972), established that an alien has no
").
standing to bring a constitutional challenge to the denial of a visa ..
58.
United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 542 (1950).
59.
Id. at 544. See also Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 713 (1893)
(Congress may give an executive officer final authority to determine whether alien
should be excluded and "if it did so, his order was due process of law. .. ").
60. See alsoJohnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763 (1950). After World War II concluded, German nationals who never had a presence in the United States were convicted by a military commission in China for violating laws of war. The Court held that
the aliens were not entitled to habeas corpus in the civilian courts to challenge their
convictions, stating that the "ultimate question in this case is one ofjurisdiction of civil
courts....." Id. at 765. The prisoners could not bring the action because they had no
presence in the country. "[T]he privilege of litigation has been extended to aliens,
whether friendly or enemy, only because permitting their presence in the country implied protection. No such basis can be invoked here, for these prisoners at no relevant
time were within any territory over which the United States is sovereign. . . ." Id. at 77778.
The German nationals, however, were not just denied access to the courts; they
also were not entided to the due process that would have been afforded to a person in
the country. The Court held that the military had the authority to try the aliens abroad
for violating the laws of war. "The jurisdiction of military authorities, during or following hostilities, to punish those guilty of offenses against the laws of war is long-established .... It being within the jurisdiction of a Military Commission to try the prisoners,
it was for it to determine whether the laws of war applied and whether an offense
against them had been committed." Id. at 786-788. Because of their status they were
not just denied access to the civil courts; they could also be validly tried in a manner
that would have ordinarily denied due process to a citizen. The government had committed no due process violation.
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if he did, an exclusion following the prescribed procedures gives all
61
the process that was due and does not violate the Constitution.
The designation of foreign terrorist groups is similar to the exclusion decision. The direct consequence to a designated organization is that "the Secretary of the Treasury may require United States
financial institutions possessing or controlling any assets of any foreign organization included in the notification to block all financial
transactions involving those assets .... "62 Clearly, if a group does
not have a presence in the United States, a group does not have
assets in the United States. Instead, the practical effect on the totally foreign organization is to prevent such a designee from putting money into a United States financial institution, which is akin
to seeking entry into the country. Just as with aliens seeking physical entry into the country, Congress has the authority to devise any
procedure for determining whether a foreign organization should
be allowed to place its assets in the country, and whatever is prescribed is the process that is due. Even if a totally foreign organization did have standing to raise a due process claim, it would not
matter. The congressionally-mandated designation procedure is all
that is due. Following it does not violate due process, and a Section
2339B prosecution based on such a designation would not be one
where an essential element of the crime had been created in violation of due process.
Organizations without a United States presence, however, are
63
little concerned with the direct consequences of the designation.
61. Judge William Fletcher of the Ninth Circuit contends that standing determinations are really decisions about the merits of a case and are indistinguishable from
determining whether the plaintiff has stated a claim upon which relief can be granted.
He concludes, "The essence of a standing inquiry is... the meaning of the specific...
constitutional provision upon which the plaintiff relies rather than a disembodied and
abstract application of general principles of standing law.... [T]he merits of a standing
claim must always depend, in the end, on the meaning of the.., constitutional clause
upon which the plaintiff relies." William A. Fletcher, The Structure of Standing, 98 YALE
L.J. 221, 239 (1988). Thanks to Donald H. Zeigler for pointing out this article to me.
62. 8 U.S.C. § 1189(a) (2) (C).
63. The designation, however, does not just exclude an organization from utilizing a bank in the United States. Assets can be frozen in any United States financial
institution, and an American bank may operate abroad. A freezing order under Section 1189 would seem to require the blocking of an organization's assets in, for example, a London branch of an American bank. See 31 C.F.R. § 597.319(a) (2001)
(definition of "United States financial institution" includes "[a] ny financial institution
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What truly concerns these organizations is that they cannot raise
funds from Americans because an American giving them money
commits a crime under Section 2339B. This consequence, how64
ever, does not affect the constitutional rights of the organization.
The prescribed procedures violate due process only when they are
used to designate an organization with a United States presence.
C.

The Reading of Notice and a Hearing into Section 1189

A Section 2339B prosecution based on the designation of an
organization with American ties will have an element created in violation of the Constitution unless Section 1189 is interpreted to require notice and a hearing as the D.C. Circuit commanded. Is it
proper to interpret the designation statute as containing these constitutionally necessary requirements when Congress did not authorize them?
In PMOI, the D.C. Circuit upheld a designation of an organization with an American presence after the Secretary of State afforded that organization notice and a hearing. This indicated that
the court found it proper to read those due process requirements
in Section 1189. Rahmani, in contrast, concluded that the designation procedures could not be interpreted to authorize a notice-andhearing requirement through statutory interpretation but only
through an improper act of judicial legislation. The line between
statutory interpretation to avoid constitutional problems and judicial legislation is unclear. 65 The Supreme Court has only offered
organized under the laws of the United States, including such financial institution's
foreign branches"). The order, then, might go beyond the equivalent of excluding an
alien from the geographic United States, but if the government can validly regulate the
activity in a foreign branch of a United States institution, an organization with assets in
the foreign branch should have a sufficient connection with the United States to give it
due process rights entitling it to notice and a hearing.
64. An alien without a presence in the United States does not have a right to raise
money here. Cf Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 771 (1972) ("[A]n alien who
seeks admission ... has no First Amendment rights while outside the Nation.
(Douglas, J., dissenting).
65.
The difficulty of determining whether constitutionally-saving restrictions can
be read into a statute is indicated by interpretation of another aspect of Section 2339B.
In HumanitarianLaw Project v. Reno, 205 F.3d 1130 (9th Cir. 2000), the plaintiffs said
that they wished to give what they feared would be considered material support in violation of Section 2339B to designated foreign terrorist groups and sought an injunction
barring enforcement of that act against them. The Ninth Circuit rejected most of the
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guidelines, not a rule, on how to find the demarcation. 66 Perhaps
plaintiffs' arguments but did conclude that the term "personnel" included in the definition of what constitutes material support or resources for the purposes of Section 2339B
was impermissibly vague and would infringe First Amendment rights. The government
suggested that "personnel" be interpreted to avoid the free speech problem by limiting
it to acts performed "under the direction and control" of the terrorist organization.
The Ninth Circuit responded, "While we construe a statute in such a way as to avoid
constitutional questions . . . we are not authorized to rewrite the law so it will pass
constitutional muster." Id. at 1138.
In contrast, the court in United States v. Lindh, 212 F. Supp. 2d 541 (E.D. Va. 2002),
did narrowly construe "personnel" to avoid constitutional problems. The defendant
was charged with violating Section 2339B and contended that providing personnel to a
designated group carried the risk that people could be convicted for merely associating
with the organization. The court responded that the plain meaning of the term meant
either "'a body of persons usu[ally] employed (as in a factory, officer, or organization),'
or 'a body of persons employed in some service.'" Id. at 572, (quoting Webster's Ninth
New Collegiate Dictionary 878 (1989); Bakal Bros., Inc. v. United States, 105 F.3d 1085,
1089 (6th Cir. 1997) (citations omitted)). The court continued, "Thus, in Section
2339B, providing 'personnel' ... means that the persons provided to the foreign terrorist organization work under the direction and control of that organization.... So construed..., there is no danger, let alone a substantial one, that Section 2339B will be
applied to infringe upon legitimate rights of association." Id. at 572-73. In other words,
Lindh accepted a reading of "personnel" that HumanitarianLaw Project maintained was
judicial legislation. Cf United States v. Goba, 220 F. Supp. 2d 182 (W.D.N.Y. 2002). In
interpreting Section 2339B on the government's application for pretrial detention of
defendants charged with providing material support or resources to a designated foreign terrorist organization, Goba after reviewing HumanitarianLaw Project and Lindh
stated: "It is easy to see how someone could be unsure about what [Section 2339B]
prohibits with the use of the term 'personnel,' as it blurs the line between protected
expression and unprotected conduct.... At this stage of the proceeding, and with due
respect to the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, I accept the reasoning of the
DistrictJudge in Lindh...." Id. at 193-94. But see Sattar, 272 F. Supp. 2d at 359 ("the
standards set out [in Lindh for 'personnel'] are not found in the statute, do not respond to the concerns of the Court of Appeals in HumanitarianLaw Project, and do not
provide standards to save the 'provision' of 'personnel' from being unconstitutionally
vague as applied to the facts alleged in the Indictment").
66. Donald H. Zeigler, Gazing Into the Crystal Ball: Reflections on the Standards State
Judges Should Use to Ascertain FederalLaw, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1143, 1197-98 (1999)
summarizes the Court's approach to statutory interpretation:
The justices start with the words of a statute when searching for its
meaning in the absence of"a clearly expressed legislative intent to the contrary." [Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp. v. Bonjorno, 494 U.S. 827, 835
(1990).] The Court does not apply the plain meaning rule "in rare cases
[when] the literal application of a statute will produce a result demonstrably at odds with the intentions of its drafters." [Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564, 571 (1982).] In such cases, the legislator's
intentions control. Similarly, the Court does not read a statute literally if
the result would be absurd and some other interpretation is available that is
consistent with legislative intent.
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the best illustration is Aptheker v. Secretary of State,67 in which the
Supreme Court held a portion of the Subversive Activities Control
Act of 1950,68 which made it unlawful for a member of an organization that had been ordered to register as a Communist organization
to obtain a passport, unconstitutional because it swept within it
both knowing and unknowing members. The Court refused to
read absent restrictions into the statute that would have rendered
the law constitutional:
It must be remembered that "although this Court will
often strain to construe legislation so as to save it against
constitutional attack, it must not and will not carry this to
the point of perverting the purpose of a statute ..."or
judicially rewriting it.... To put the matter another way,
this Court will not consider the abstract question of
whether Congress might have enacted a valid statute but
instead must ask whether the statute that Congress did
enact will permissibly bear a construction rendering it
free from constitutional defects.
The clarity and preciseness of the provision in question make it impossible to narrow its indiscriminately cast
69
and overly broad scope without substantial rewriting.
This language implies that a notice-and-hearing requirement
should not be read into the designation procedures. Congress did
not enact that requirement, and the clarity and preciseness of the
enacted procedures indicate that the omission was intentional. The
absence of notice and a hearing fits in with the scheme that limits
the procedural rights of the organizations. Thus, the Secretary
never has to give direct notice to the organization even after it is
designated; publication in the Federal Register suffices. There is
but a thirty day window for judicial review, and that review is limited
to the administrative record compiled by the Secretary and classiThe problem, of course, is that the justices disagree about how these
principles apply in individual cases.

67.
68.

378 U.S. 500 (1964).
50 U.S.C. § 785 (repealed 1993).

69. 378 U.S. at 515 (quoting Scales v. United States 367 U.S. 203, 211 (1961)). See
also West Virginia Univ. Hosps. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83, 101 (1991) ("[The statute's] language is plain and unambiguous. What the government asks is not construction of a
statute, but, in effect, an enlargement of it by the court .... To supply omissions
transcends the judicial function.").
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flied information revealed to the court but not the organization.
The organization is not permitted to present information even for
the purposes of judicial review. Furthermore, Section 1189 clearly
authorizes the same procedures for all organizations; no distinction
is made between groups with or without a United States presence.
Reading a notice-and hearing requirement into Section 1189 for
some organizations is not merely interpreting the statute Congress
did enact but inserting something into it purposely left out, an act
akin to amending the statute.
The Court, however, has on other occasions read into a statute
a procedure that seems to have been purposely omitted by Congress. Most pertinent here are cases considering legislative schemes
that have prohibited judicial review in a criminal proceeding of an
administrative action that has furnished an essential element of the
crime. A number of times, instead of finding the legislative scheme
unconstitutional, the Court has found a right of review in the criminal case regardless of the prohibition.7 0 If courts can validly find a
right of judicial review that Congress has not authorized, perhaps
courts can just as validly find a notice-and-hearing requirement that
71
Congress has not enacted.
If courts do not have that power, then all designations of organizations entitled to due process are unconstitutional. If courts do
have that power, then such designations are constitutional if the
Secretary has afforded the prescribed notice and hearing. Until the
Supreme Court decides the matter, we can expect lower courts considering the issue to differ. Meanwhile, nothing indicates that the
Secretary is giving notice and a hearing to organizations entitled to
due process except when the D.C. Circuit has specifically ordered it
70. See, e.g., Touby v. United States, 500 U.S. 160 (1991); United States v. Mendoza-Lopez, 481 U.S. 828 (1987); Adamo v. United States, 434 U.S. 275 (1978); Dickinson v. United States, 346 U.S. 389 (1953); and Estep v. United States, 327 U.S. 114
(1946). These cases are discussed more fully infra, notes 81-118 and accompanying
text.
71.
The words of Henry Hart and Albert Sacks bear repeating, "Do not expect
anybody's theory of statutory interpretation, whether it is your own or somebody else's,
to be an accurate statement of what courts actually do with statutes. The hard truth of
the matter is that American courts have no intelligible, generally accepted, and consistently applied theory of statutory interpretation." HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M.
SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS 1169 (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds.,
1994).
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for a particular group. What effect should such a constitutional violation have on Section 2339B prosecutions?
IV.

THE PROCESS DUE AN ACCUSED IN A SECTION

2339B

PROSECUTION

A crime is not constitutionally created unless all elements of
the crime are constitutionally created, and a defendant charged
with such a crime has standing to challenge the constitutional defect. An accused in a Section 2339B prosecution has the right of
judicial review with regard to whether an element of his prosecution - the designation of the foreign terrorist organization - was

made in violation of due process.
A.

Prosecutions When An Essential Element Has Been
Unconstitutionally Created

Early in our history, the Supreme Court held that there were
no federal common law crimes and that Congress had to enact a
statute making conduct criminal for that conduct to constitute a
federal crime. 72 As the Court has more recently said, " [t] he definition of the elements of a criminal offense is entrusted to the legislature, particularly in the case of federal crimes, which are solely
creatures of statute. ' 73 For a crime to be valid, the criminal statute
and all the elements of the defined crime must have been validly
enacted. If, taking an extreme example, a criminal law were enacted by only one House of Congress, a prosecution under that statute would be unconstitutional because the conduct would not have
been made criminal by a statute. Similarly, a crime can be valid
only if all its elements have been validly enacted. If, for example,
the statutory scheme of which Section 2339B is a part gave the designation power not to the Secretary of State but to either House
72. United States v. Hudson, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32 (1812). See Mark D. Alexander, Note, IncreasedJudicialScrutiny for the Administrative Crime, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 612,
615 (1992) (The effect of Hudson and Goodwin "was that only the legislature could creates crimes in the federal government."); see also Edmund H. Schwenk, The Administrative Crime, Its Creation and Punishment by Administrative Agencies, 42 MICH. L. REv. 51, 53
(1943) ("There are no common-law crimes within the areas of the federal government .... Hence if an act is to constitute a crime, it must be created by statute, and by a
statute only.").
73. Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419, 424 (1985).
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alone, the resulting designations would not be validly enacted and
could not act as an essential element in a Section 2339B
74
prosecution.
Here the existing scheme does not delegate the designation
authority to one House of Congress but to the Secretary of State.
Congress can delegate the authority to create elements of a crime
to administrative officers and agencies. 75 The due process issue in a
Section 2339B prosecution, however, is not whether Congress can
delegate the designations to the Secretary, but whether a designation, and therefore an essential element of a prosecution, has been
made by constitutionally authorized procedures. Just as a criminal
"law" cannot be used to prosecute an accused if Congress adopted
the provision by unconstitutional procedures, Congress cannot create crimes by mandating that others use unconstitutional procedures to create an element of a crime. Congress can delegate to
others, but it cannot delegate what it does not have, the power to
act unconstitutionally.
Sattar missed the point of the due process concern in a Section
2339B prosecution by concluding that the issue in a Section 2339B
prosecution is only whether the organization had been designated,
not "the correctness of the designation itself.. ."76 The question is
not just whether the Secretary made the designation, and it is not
whether the Secretary made proper policy choices in designating
an organization. Instead, the issue is the constitutionality of the
procedures to create an element of the crime, for a person can only
be constitutionally convicted if a crime has been validly created.
The government apparently conceded in Rahmani that if the Supreme Court found that a designation violated due process because
notice and a hearing were not afforded, that designation could not
74.
See Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
75.
See United States v. Grimaud, 220 U.S. 506, 517 (1911) ("[W]hen Congress
had legislated and indicated its will, it could give to those who were to act under such
general provision 'power to fill up the details' by the establishment of administrative
rules and regulations, the violation of which could be punished by fine or imprisonment fixed by Congress . . . ."); see Schwenk, supra note 72, at 58 ("Once it is admitted
that the creation of a criminal offense is not the 'exclusive' function of the legislature,
there is no reason why the administrative agency may not participate in the creation of
a criminal offense under the rules of delegation of power, i.e., in the event that the
legislature has set a sufficient primary standard in the act.").
76. United States v. Sattar, 272 F. Supp. 2d 348, 368 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
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be used in a Section 2339B prosecution. 7 7 That concession indicates the obvious - a valid prosecution requires more than just the
mere fact of a designation but a constitutionally-valid designation.
A crime is not a crime unless all its elements are constitutionally
created.
A Supreme Court ruling that a particular designation violated
due process is not necessary to make a Section 2339B prosecution
invalid. Assume that a designation were made on January 1; a person gave the organization money on February 1; and the Supreme
Court held that the designation violated due process on June 1. If
all that mattered is whether a designation had been made, the donor could still be convicted of the crime. The government's position as indicated in Rahmani, however, seems to be that the person
could be validly convicted on April 1 before the Court ruled, but
not on August 1. But if the August 1 conviction could not stand
because the designation was unconstitutional, then the April 1 conviction must also have been invalid. The unconstitutionality did not
occur when the Court ruled. If the Court finds a designation unconstitutional, it would be holding that the designation was unconstitutional when made. The designation would have been null at its
inception. The issue is not whether the Supreme Court has ruled
but whether all the necessary elements of the crime have been validly created. If they have not been, then the crime does not exist
under our Constitution.
B.

The CriminalDefendant's Standing

A defendant in a Section 2339B prosecution has standing to
raise the claim that an essential element in his prosecution was unconstitutionally created. District Judge Koeltl in Sattar misunderstood the nature of the claim when he concluded that the
defendants lacked standing because they were merely raising another's constitutional rights. 78 The Section 2339B defendant is not
just a third party trying to raise the constitutional rights of an77. See United States v. Rahmani, 209 F. Supp. 2d 1045, 1053 (C.D. Cal. 2002)
("The government avers that if the D.C. Circuit or the Supreme Court struck down
Section 1189 as unconstitutional defendants would then be entitled to raise this defense
78. See Sattar, 272 F. Supp. 2d at 364 ("While the defendants can challenge the
allegation that they violated § 2339B by providing material support to an FFO or could
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other. 79 The accused is not asking the court to rescind a foreign
terrorist organization designation and the criminal court clearly
does not have that authority. Instead, the Section 2339B defendant
is asking the criminal court to find that an element essential to his
prosecution was unconstitutionally created and that it, therefore,
cannot be used in his case. If the criminal court agrees, the defendant is directly affected because he could not be prosecuted, but
the designation of the organization would still remain in effect until, if ever, the D.C. Circuit found the designation invalid. The government could still freeze the organization's assets, but it could not
prosecute the defendant.
Imagine again that the Supreme Court found that a particular
designation was made in violation of due process. If an accused
were then prosecuted for material support to that organization, he
would have standing to raise the validity of the designation. With
regard to standing, a defendant is in precisely the same position
even if the Supreme Court has not ruled on the designation that
forms an essential element of his prosecution. A defendant is directly asserting the right to be tried only for a crime that was constitutionally created.8 0 If the accused is to be denied review of the
constitutionality of the procedures used to designate a foreign terrorist organization, it must be for some other reason than that he
lacks standing.
C.

The Prohibition ofJudicialReview in the Criminal Case
Can Congress, as in Section 1189,81 prohibit a defendant from
challenging the validity of a statute under which he is prosecuted?
contest that IG was in fact, designated as an Fro, they cannot assert the due process
claims of the FTO and challenge the underlying designation.").
79. Cf Center for Reproductive Law and Policy v. Bush, 304 F.3d 183, 196 (2d
Cir. 2002), relied on by Sattar,272 F. Supp. 2d at 364 ("Plaintiffs' allegation, simply put, is
that the vague language of the Standard Clause causes the foreign [non-governmental
organizations] to be overly cautious in avoiding interaction with plaintiffs, which in
turn harms plaintiffs' speech and association interests ....
As plaintiffs do not assert
harm to their own interest in receiving due process of law, this is precisely the sort of
claim that the prudential standing doctrine is designed to foreclose.").
80. See Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984) ("The requirement of standing
. . . has a core component derived directly from the Constitution. A plaintiff must
allege personal injury fairly traceable to the defendant's allegedly unlawful conduct and
likely to be redressed by the requested relief.").
81.
8 U.S.C. § 1189(a)(8) (2003).
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That question is answered by examining a series of Supreme Court
cases that granted a right of review in a criminal case of an administrative action that established an element of a criminal offense even
though Congress had not authorized, or even seemingly prohibited, such review. In Estep v. United States8 2 the defendant was convicted of violating the Selective Service Act by refusing to be
inducted into the armed forces. Estep claimed that he should have
been exempted from the draft because he was a religious minister,
but his local draft board ordered his induction. The Selective Service Act made a local draft board's classifications final and did not
permit any judicial review of a board's classification. Even so, the
Supreme Court held that Estep was entitled to a limited review of
the administrative action in a criminal case. The Court first reasoned that a draft board's classification was lawful only if the board
had jurisdiction to issue the classification 8 3 and then concluded:
We cannot readily infer that Congress departed so far
from the traditional concepts of a fair trial when it made
the actions of the local boards 'final' as to provide that a
citizen of this country should go to jail for not obeying an
unlawful order of an administrative agency.... The provision making the decisions of the local boards 'final'
means to us that Congress chose not to give administrative action under this Act the customary scope of judicial
review which obtains under other statutes. It means that
the courts are not to weigh the evidence to determine
whether the classification made by the local boards was
justified. The decisions made by the local boards made in
conformity with the regulations are final even though
they may be erroneous. The question of jurisdiction is
reached only if there is no basis in fact for the classifica84
tion which it gave the registrant.

82. 327 U.S. 114 (1946).
83. The Court stated, "It is only orders 'within their respective jurisdictions' that
are made final. It would seem, therefore, that if a Pennsylvania board ordered a citizen
and resident of Oregon to report for induction, the defense that it acted beyond its
jurisdiction could be interposed in a prosecution [for failing to submit to induction.]"
327 U.S. at 120.
84. 327 U.S. at 122-23; accord Dickinson v. United States, 346 U.S. 389 (1953).
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The Court thus ruled that the defendant could have review in
the criminal case of whether there was no basis in fact for the administrative action that had created an element of the prosecution.
85
The Court reached a similar result in Adamo v. United States.
Adamo Wrecking Company was indicted for violating an "emission
standard" issued by the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency, who was authorized by the Clean Air Act to issue such
regulations. That Act permitted judicial review by affected parties
within thirty days after the regulation's promulgation in the D.C.
Circuit. Further, the Act expressly prohibited review in a criminal
case of an administrative action of the Administrator that could
have been reviewed in the D.C. Circuit. 6 Even with this specific
statutory prohibition, the Adamo court held that the accused is entitled to judicial review of the administrative action in a criminal
case. Justice Rehnquist, writing for the Court, reasoned that under
the part of the statutory scheme at issue, Congress had authorized
the Administrator to issue "emission standards," which Congress intended to be regulations of a certain sort, not merely any rule that
the Administrator chose to label an "emission standard."8 7 Consequently, the review restriction applied only to regulations that were
"emission standards." The Court concluded that, in spite of the explicit prohibition on review in a criminal case, Congress did not
intend to make the Administrator's decision that a regulation was
an "emission standard" conclusive in a criminal case. Accordingly,
the court in a criminal proceeding has the authority to determine
whether a regulation that created an essential element of the crime
is indeed an "emission standard." The Court noted that any doubts
on the matter should be resolved in the defendant's favor.88 Adamo
85. 434 U.S. 275 (1978).
86. "Action of the Administrator with respect to which review could have been
obtained [in the D.C. Circuit] shall not be subject to judicial review in civil or criminal
proceedings for enforcement." 42 U.S.C. § 1857h-5(b) (2), quoted in Adamo, 434 U.S. at
277.
87. "Congress intended, within broad limits, that 'emission standards' be regulations of a certain type, and it did not empower the Administrator, after the manner of
Humpty Dumpty in Through the Looking-Glass, to make a regulation an 'emission standard' by his mere designation." Adamo, 434 U.S. at 283.
88. "At the very least, it may be said that the issue is subject to some doubt. Under
these circumstances, we adhere to the familiar rule that where there is some ambiguity
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concluded that the regulation at issue was not an "emission standard," and sustained the trial court's dismissal of the indictment.
The issue in Touby v. United States89 was the temporary scheduling of drugs. In the Controlled Substance Act, 90 Congress delegated to the Attorney General the authority to classify controlled
substances, with those placed on Schedule I carrying the most serious penalties for violation of the drug laws. The law prescribes procedures to be used and factors that the Attorney General must
consider in the scheduling. The Act also permits any "aggrieved
person" to challenge a permanent scheduling in a court of
appeals. 9 1
This permanent scheduling takes some time, and the law also
permits the Attorney General to temporarily schedule drugs under
streamlined procedures to move quicker against fast-emerging "designer drugs."92 A temporary scheduling remains in effect for one
year, which gives the Attorney General time for a permanent scheduling. While the Act provides for judicial review of a permanent
order, it states that a temporary scheduling "is not subject to judicial review." 93 The Touby defendants, convicted of making a substance that had been temporarily placed on Schedule I by the
Attorney General, contended that the judicial-review prohibition violated the Constitution.
Touby reiterated the basic principle about congressional delegations to others:
Congress does not violate the Constitution merely because it legislates in broad terms, leaving a certain degree
of discretion to executive or judicial actors. So long as
Congress 'lay[s] down by legislative act an intelligible
principle to which the person or body authorized to [act]
in a criminal statute, doubts are resolved in favor of the defendant." 434 U.S. at 284-85,
(quoting United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 348 (1971)).
89. 500 U.S. 160 (1991).
90. 21 U.S.C. § 801 (2003).
91.
Touby, 500 U.S. at 163.
92. The Court explained: "Drug traffickers were able to take advantage of this
time gap by designing drugs that were similar in pharmacological effect to scheduled
substances but differed slightly in chemical composition, so that existing schedules did
not apply to them. These 'designer drugs' were developed and widely marketed long
before the Government was able to schedule them and initiate prosecution." Id.
93. 21 U.S.C. § 811(h)(6) (2003), quoted in Touby, 500 U.S. at 163.
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is directed to conform, such legislative action is not a for' 94
bidden delegation of legislative power.
The defendants argued that the prohibition on judicial review
violated the nondelegation doctrine because "the purpose of requiring an 'intelligible principle' is to permit a court to 'ascertain
whether the will of Congress has been obeyed.' "9
The Court rejected this argument but only by finding a right of
judicial review in the criminal case in spite of the express statutory
prohibition. The Court noted that a permanent scheduling order
was subject to judicial review and continued:
Even before a permanent scheduling order is entered, judicial review is possible under certain circumstances. The
United States contends, and we agree, that [the prohibition on judicial review] does not preclude an individual
facing criminal charges from bringing a challenge to a
temporary scheduling order as a defense to a prosecution.... This is sufficient to permit a court to "ascertain
whether the will of Congress has been obeyed...." Under
these circumstances, the nondelegation doctrine does not
require, in addition, an opportunity for 9preenforcement
6
review of administrative determinations.
Although Touby does not expressly state it, the implication is
that without such judicial review that statutory scheme would have
violated the essential checks and balances of the Constitution. Only
the fundamental charter would have given the Court the authority
to find a right of review when Congress had expressly forbidden it,
and the Court did not disagree with the opinion ofJustice Marshall,
joined by Justice Blackmun, who in concurring explicitly stated the
constitutional basis of the decision. He wrote separately to
emphasize . . . that the opportunity to a defendant to

challenge the substance of a temporary scheduling order
in the course of criminal prosecution is essential to the
result in this case .... Because of the severe impact of
94.
394, 409
95.
96.
212, 218

500 U.S. at 165 (quoting J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S.
(1928)).
500 U.S. at 168 (internal citations and quotations omitted).
500 U.S. at 168-69 (quoting Skinner v. Mid-America Pipeline Co., 490 U.S.
(1989)).
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criminal laws on individual liberty, I believe that an opportunity to challenge a delegated lawmaker's compliance with congressional directives is a constitutional
necessity when administrative standards are enforced by
criminal law...

We must therefore read the Controlled

Substances Act as preserving judicial review of a temporary scheduling order in the course of a criminal prosecution in order to save the Act's delegation of lawmaking
97
power from unconstitutionality.
The constitutional basis for the right of review in criminal cases
is also indicated by Estep and Adamo. Both of those cases relied on
98
what might be characterized as creative statutory interpretations,
but the interpretations were apparently driven by notions that the
statutory schemes without the judicial review in the criminal cases
were fundamentally unfair. 99 If, as the results in Touby, Estep, and
Adamo indicate, judicial review in a criminal case is constitutionally
required to ensure administrative conformance to congressional di97. 500 U.S. at 169-70.
98. Justice Stewart dissenting in Adamo stated that the majority's statutory interpretation was "tampering with the plain statutory language ..
" 434 U.S. at 291.
99. Estep indicated this when it said, "We cannot readily infer that Congress departed so far from the traditional concepts of a fair trial when it made the actions of the
local boards 'final' as to provide that a citizen of this country should go to jail for not
obeying an unlawful order of an administrative agency. We are loathe to believe that
Congress reduced criminal trials under the Act to proceedings so barren of the customary safeguards which the law has designed for the protection of the accused." 327 U.S.
at 122. Estep also noted that habeas corpus was available when a person was held in
violation of the Constitution or the laws and stated the defendant after conviction could
"challenge the jurisdiction of the local board.... The court would then be sending
men to jail today when it was apparent that they would have to be released tomorrow."
Id. at 124-25.
A number of the fairness concerns cited by Adamo apply at least as much to Section
2339B prosecutions. Thus, it could be said for a Section 2339B as it was for the Clean
Air Act defendant that "[n]ot only is the Administrator's promulgation of the standard
not subject to judicial review in the criminal proceeding, but no prior notice of violation from the Administrator is required as a condition for criminal liability." 434 U.S. at
283. Adamo also stated, "The severity of the scheme is accentuated by the fact that
persons subject to the Act, including innumerable small businesses, may protect themselves against arbitrary administrative action only by daily perusal of proposed emission
standards in the Federal Register and by immediate initiation of litigation in the District
of Columbia to protect their interests." Id. at n.2. Anyone giving money or other aid to
an organization can only know if they are committing a crime by regular reading of the
Federal Register, but unlike in Adamo, the potential donor has no opportunity to challenge the administrative action in the D.C. Circuit.

2003]

DUE PROCESS DENIAL

rectives when the administrative action furnishes an essential element of the crime, then judicial review of such an administrative
action must be constitutionally required in a criminal case to ensure conformance with the more fundamental law set out in the
Constitution. This is precisely what the Court indicated in the most
significant in this series of cases, United States v. Mendoza-Lopez. 10 0
In Mendoza-Lopez, the defendants were indicted for the felony
of entering the United States after having been deported.1 0 1 They
sought to dismiss the indictment claiming their predicate deportations resulted from a fundamentally unfair hearing denying them
due process. The immigration law at issue did not permit judicial
review of the deportation order itself, and the Court concluded that
the criminal statute did not permit a challenge to a predicate deportation order in the criminal case either. 10 2 Confronted with a
statutory scheme that prohibited judicial review of the administrative action, the Court found the scheme unconstitutional.
The Court stated that the crime could not be based merely on
the fact that a deportation had been ordered. Rather, the proceeding that ordered the deportation had to afford due process: "If the
statute envisions that a court may impose a criminal penalty for reentry after any deportation, regardless of how violative of the rights
of the alien the deportation proceeding may have been, the statute
does not comport with the constitutional requirements of due process." 10 3 Justice Marshall's opinion for the Court concluded that
the alien must have judicial review in the criminal case of whether
the administrative action had afforded due process:
Our cases establish that where a determination made in
an administrative proceeding is to play a critical role in
the subsequent imposition of a criminal sanction, there
must be some meaningful review of the administrative proceeding .... This principle means at the very least that
where the defects in an administrative proceeding foreclose judicial review of that proceeding, an alternative
100. 481 U.S. 828 (1987).
101. Id. See 8 U.S.C. § 1326 (2003).
102. "The text and background of [the criminal statute] thus indicate no congressional intent to sanction challenges to deportation orders in [the criminal] proceedings. . . ." 481 U.S. at 837.
103. 481 U.S. at 837.
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means of obtaining judicial review must be made available
before the administrative order may be used to establish
conclusively an element of a criminal offense .... Depriving an alien of the right to have the disposition in a deportation hearing reviewed in a judicial forum requires,
at a minimum, that review be made available in any subsequent proceeding in which the result of the deportation
10 4
is used to establish an element of the offense.
In Mendoza-Lopez, the aliens had been ordered deported in a
proceeding that had not afforded due process, but could not be
judicially reviewed. When the government attempted to use that
administrative order as an essential element in a prosecution, the
Court held that the defendants had the right of review in the criminal case of the constitutional validity of the order. The Court held
that because the deportation proceeding denied due process, it
may not be used to support a criminal conviction .... "105
Superficially, the situation in Mendoza-Lopez appears different
from a Section 2339B prosecution. In Mendoza-Lopez, the alien was
ordered deported in a hearing that denied him due process but the
administrative process did not permit review of the order. When
the alien was subsequently prosecuted for reentry into the country
after that deportation order, the government sought to deny him
the opportunity to challenge the fairness of the deportation proceeding in the criminal case. In a Section 2339B prosecution, an
organization is designated a foreign terrorist organization without
affording the organization the notice and hearing required by due
process, but the organization can seek judicial review.
On the other hand, at a fundamental level, the two situations
are the same. A determination that violated due process is made a deportation order or a designation - and the government seeks to
use that determination as an essential element in a subsequent
criminal prosecution. The precise nature of the constitutional defect is irrelevant; the constitutional defects are alike in that in each
an essential criminal element was created in violation of the Constitution, and in each the statutory scheme did not grant the accused
the right to have judicial review of the unconstitutionality. Since
104.
105.

481 U.S. at 837-38 (emphasis in original).
481 U.S. at 842.
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the accused was granted the right of review in the criminal case of
the element's constitutionality in Mendoza-Lopez, an accused in a
Section 2339B also has a right of review of the constitutionality of
that crime's elements.
Even so, Sattar found no right of review in a Section 2339B
prosecution and specifically sought to distinguish Mendoza-Lopez
and Touby. Judge Koeltl concluded that Mendoza-Lopez was not controlling. In the statutory scheme at issue in Mendoza-Lopez, no review of any sort was authorized of the administrative action while in
the statutory scheme of which Section 2339B is a part, the organization is permitted judicial review of the designation: "Raising the
defense in the criminal cases provided those defendants [in Mendoza-Lopez] the only meaningful review of the administrative proceeding affecting them. In this case, it is clear that Congress
provided [the designated organization] with judicial review of its
own designation. The administrative determination of the designation of an Fro is potentially subject to extensive judicial review but
that review is not to occur as a defense in a criminal proceeding. '10 6
In other words, because others could challenge the administrative action, a Section 2339B accused cannot. This stands the accepted prohibition on contesting the rights of others on its head.
UnderJudge Koeltl's theory, an accused can establish his right not
to be prosecuted for a crime containing an essential element created in violation of due process only if a third party has successfully
exercised its right of judicial review. Sattar cited nothing for the
proposition that granting review to a third party could wipe out the
accused's due process right of review. 10 7 Mendoza-Lopez certainly
106.
107.

Sattar, 272 F. Supp. 2d at 366 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1189(a)(8) (2003)).
Cf Alexander, supra note 72 at 637:
[A] no-review provision for an administrative crime is not made constitutional by the opportunity to challenge a regulation in a limited time and
forum. It is no solace to a defendant facing prosecution under an arguably
illegal rule to know that she would have had the chance to challenge the
rule had she thought of it earlier. Nor is it comforting to know that the
rule was in fact challenged by a civil litigant whose motives may differ
greatly from a defendant facing an actual criminal conviction. Indeed, real
reason exists to doubt whether a judge presiding over a civil challenge to a
regulation punishable by criminal penalties will evaluate the rule in the
same light as he might in a criminal trial, where the stakes are more
apparent.
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did not rest on, or even suggest, such a novel doctrine. Instead,
Mendoza-Lopez at most indicated that due process review in the criminal case was not constitutionally required if the accused had had an
earlier right of judicial review in the administrative proceeding:
Depriving an alien of the right to have the disposition in a
deportation hearing reviewed in a judicial forum requires, at a minimum, that review be made available in
any subsequent proceeding in which the result of the deportation is used to establish an element of the offense. . . . [A] collateral challenge to the use of a
deportation proceeding as an element of a criminal offense must be permitted where the deportation proceeding effectively eliminates the right of the alien to obtain
judicial review .... 108
Mendoz-Lopez held that the person charged with the crime had
the right to judicial review of the constitutionality of a crime's element, not that review can be denied because a third party could
have sought review. Sattar did note that the only meaningful review
for the Mendoza-Lopez defendants was in the criminal case, and precisely the same is true for Section 2339B defendants-the only

meaningful judicial review they can have is in the criminal case. Of
course, if the statutory scheme in which Section 2339B is imbedded
required due process for the creation of all the prosecution's elements including the designation, an accused would not have a viable constitutional claim to be reviewed in the criminal case. The
statutory scheme, on the other hand, permits an element of the
accused's prosecution to be created in violation of due process, for
108. 481 U.S. at 838-39 (emphasis added); Mendoza-Lopez's discussion of Lewis v.
United States, 445 U.S. 55 (1980), is telling. Lewis had been convicted of the federal
crime of possessing a firearm after having been convicted of a felony. He claimed that
the predicate conviction had been obtained in state court in violation of his Sixth
Amendment right to counsel. Lewis held that the federal criminal statute did not allow
him to attack the prior state conviction in the federal criminal case and that this prohibition did not violate the Fifth Amendment. Mendoza-Lopez noted, "In rejecting the
notion that the statute permitted, or the Constitution required, this 'new form of collateral attack' on prior convictions, the Court pointed to the availability of alternative
means to secure judicial review of the conviction: '[I] t is important to note that a convicted felon may challenge the validity of a prior conviction, or otherwise remove his
disability, before obtaining a firearm.'" Mendoza-Lopez, 481 U.S. at 841 (quoting Lewis,
445 U.S. at 67).
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which the accused has no right of review except the one that is
constitutionally required, as Mendoza-Lopez indicates, in the criminal case.
One of the grounds Sattar gave for distinguishing Touby was
similar to its treatment of Mendoza-Lopez. The district court stated
that Touby contained "no suggestion that the judicial review for a
permanent scheduling order was permitted as a defense in a criminal prosecution, and the challenge to a temporary scheduling order
in a criminal prosecution was the only place where a challenge
could occur. In this case, like the challenge to a permanent scheduling order, Congress has provided an explicit place for judicial review - in the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia." 1 9
Sattar is correct that Touby did not suggest that an accused
could have judicial review of a permanent scheduling order in a
criminal case. This is not surprising because a temporary scheduling order, not a permanent one, was before the Court. Furthermore, Sattar overlooked one important aspect of the review
provisions for permanent scheduling orders-unlike with a foreign
terrorist organization designation, "any aggrieved person" had the
right to challenge a permanent scheduling order, including those
aggrieved persons later charged with violations of the drug laws."I 0
Even if Touby can be imaginatively read to deny an accused a review
of a permanent scheduling order in a criminal case, the Court
would merely have been denying such review when the accused had
had an earlier opportunity for judicial review, an opportunity denied the Section 2339B defendant.
Indeed, the Supreme Court has held that an accused might be
deprived of judicial review of an administrative action in the criminal case when that accused had a prior opportunity for judicial review. During World War II, in the Emergency Price Control Act of
1942, Congress delegated the power to set prices on various commodities to the Office of Price Administration ("OPA"). The Act
allowed anyone aggrieved by the price controls to seek judicial review of the administrative orders, but it did not allow review of the
orders in criminal prosecutions. The defendants in Yakus v. United
109.
110.

272 F. Supp. 2d at 366.
Touby, 500 U.S. at 163.
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States1 1' were convicted of selling beef at prices above the maximum set by the OPA. The defendants were aware of the regulation
and did not seek the authorized review, but still contended that
they were entitled to judicial review of the regulation in the criminal case.
The Supreme Court rejected their claim and held that the review prohibition did not violate due process. In reaching this conclusion, the Court stressed that the defendants had not sought the
authorized review:
There is no constitutional requirement that that test be
made in one tribunal rather than in another, so long as
there is an opportunity to be heard and for judicial review
which satisfies the demands of due process ....
[W] e are
pointed to no principle of law or provision of the Constitution which precludes Congress from making criminal
the violation of an administrative regulation, by one who
has failed to avail himself of an adequate separate procedure for the adjudication of its validity . ... 112
While Yakus did hold that affording an accused an earlier opportunity for judicial review could deprive the accused of review of
an administrative order in the criminal cases, Yakus now seems confined to its facts. Referring to the World War II case, Mendoza-Lopez
stated, "While the Court has permitted criminal conviction for violation of an administrative regulation where the validity could not
be challenged in the criminal proceeding... the decision in that
case was motivated by the exigencies of wartime, dealt with the propriety of regulations rather than the legitimacy of an adjudicative
procedure, and most significantly, turned on the fact that adequate
judicial review of the validity of the regulation was available in another forum. Under different circumstances, the propriety of using
113
an administrative ruling in such a way remains open to question."
Justice Powell, concurring in Adamo, observed that in Yakus, the
"statute there came before the Court during World War II, and it
111. 321 U.S. 414 (1944). See Alexander, supra note 72, at 630 ("The Court disposed of Yakus's due process challenge by analogizing his situation to that of a litigant
who waives the right to assert a constitutional right by failing to raise it in a timely
manner.").

112.
113.

321 U.S. at 444.
481 U.S. at 838 n.15.
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can be viewed as a valid exercise of the war powers of Congress ....
Although the opinion of Chief Justice Stone [in Yakus] is not free
from ambiguity, there is language emphasizing that the price controls imposed by the Congress were a 'war emergency measure.' Indeed, the Government argued that the statute should be upheld
under the war powers authority of Congress."'1 14 Faced in Adamo
with a statutory scheme similar to that in Yakus, where review in a
criminal case was expressly prohibited but the accused had the opportunity for review in another forum, the Court chose not to follow Yakus and granted the accused a right of review of the
administrative action in the criminal case.
In any event, Yakus made it clear that the defendants' opportunity for judicial review in another forum was crucial to the decision.
The Court did so when it stressed what was not before it:
We have no occasion to decide whether one charged with
criminal violation of a duly promulgated price regulation
is unconstitutional on its face. Nor do we consider
whether one who is forced to trial and convicted of violation of a regulation, while diligently seeking determination of its validity by the statutory procedure may thus be
deprived of the defense that the regulation is invalid....
Even though the statute should be deemed to require it,
any ruling at the criminal trial which would preclude the
accused from showing that he had had no opportunity to
establish the invalidity of the regulation by resort to the
statutory procedure, would be reviewable on appeal on
5
constitutional grounds."
The Section 2339B defendant, however, is arguing that the designation procedures resulted in a due process violation. Yakus, the
highwater mark for denying review in a criminal case of an administrative action, stated that an accused had a constitutional right to
show that he had been denied the opportunity of review in another
forum even though others had the right of review and may have
sought it, indicating that a prosecution would be invalid without the
accused having an opportunity for judicial review of the administrative action. Yakus, like the other cases, indicates that the prosecu114.
115.

434 U.S. at 290.
321 U.S. at 446-47.
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tion of a Section 2339B defendant, who has "no opportunity to
establish the invalidity of the regulation by resort to the statutory
procedure," is unconstitutional unless the accused has a right of
judicial review of the administrative action in the criminal case.
Indeed, it is worth considering again Justice Rutledge's influential dissent in Yakus, justly labeled "eloquent" by Justice
16
Powell. 1
It is one thing for Congress to withhold jurisdiction. It is
entirely another to confer it and direct that it be exercised in a manner inconsistent with constitutional requirements or, what in some instances may be the same
thing, without regard to them. Once it is held that Congress can require the court criminally to enforce unconstitutional laws or statutes, including regulations, or to do so
without regard for their validity, the way will have been
found to circumvent the supreme law and, what is more,
to make the court parties to doing so ....

But whenever

the judicial power is called into play, it is responsible directly to the fundamental law and no other authority can
intervene to force or authorize the judicial body to disregard it. The problem therefore is not solely one of individual right or due process of law. It is equally one of the
separation and independence of the powers and of the
constitutional integrity of the judicial process, more espe1 17
cially in criminal trials.
Rutledge wrote about a scheme where the accused had had an
opportunity for review of the administrative action. His words apply with even more force to a scheme where the accused has no
opportunity for review of an element of his prosecution created by
the administrative action and where Congress has mandated procedures for that creation that can violate due process. If Congress
116. See Adamo v. United States, 434 U.S. at 290-91 (Powell, J., concurring) ("Indeed, following Yakus, and apparently concerned by Mr. Justice Rutledge's eloquent
dissent, Congress amended the most onerous features of the Emergency Price Control
Act.").
117. 321 U.S. at 468 (Rutledge,J. concurring); See Alexander, supra note 72 at 63132 (Rutledge argued that "[m]erely because Congress could withhold jurisdiction did
not mean that it could bestow jurisdiction so limited as to violate due process. The
judicial power, once granted, must include at a minimum the ability to adjudicate a
criminal defendant's constitutional challenges.").
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can require enforcement of Section 2339B without review in the
criminal case, it requires a court in a criminal case to sanction an
unconstitutional prosecution without even granting review to the
person directly affected by the unconstitutionality. Congress will
have found a way to circumvent the supreme law's application even
to itself and will have made the courts a partner to the
circumvention.
This problem of individual rights, due process, and separation
of powers is particularly acute in a Section 2339B prosecution since
even a designated foreign terrorist organization entitled to due process may not seek the statutorily-authorized review of the designation. First, the organization is only given thirty days for review, and
it may not be aware during that time that a designation has even
been made. The organization is not given notice of an impending
action and can only learn of the designation by seeing its publication in the Federal Register. Adamo questioned whether even members of a regulated industry daily peruse the Register. 118 Surely
foreign organizations not normally regulated by the United States
read the Federal Register even less avidly, and the organization's
highly limited window for review can disappear before the organization knows of the designation.
Furthermore, the organization, even if aware of the designation, may not wish to take the risks that would be associated with a
review. To establish its right to due process, it will have to reveal its
property and operations in the United States in order to demonstrate the constitutionally-required American presence. This act
may inform the government of previously unknown assets and subject them to freezing if the challenge were not successful. If the
challenge were upheld, the organization might still expect increased governmental attention to its previously unknown American operations even if those activities are not terrorist related. In
addition, the organization faces the possibility of a redesignation
after notice and a hearing with the freezing of now disclosed resources. An organization might quite rationally choose not to run
these risks and forego challenging the designation even if aware of
it and even if the organization could establish a due process
violation.
118.

See 434 U.S. at 283 n.2.
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If Congress can prevent review in a Section 2339B prosecution
of its actions in mandating procedures that violate due process, the
courts will be enforcing an unconstitutional prosecution that cannot be challenged by the accused and will not have been challenged by others granted the limited right of review. Congress,
then, surely has found a way to circumvent the supreme law.
The conflict between individual rights, due process, and separation of powers can only be avoided by granting review in the criminal case. As we have seen, Mendoza-Lopez and the other cases
indicate that the accused has that right of review. An accused in a
Section 2339B prosecution is entitled to judicial review in the criminal case of the Secretary of State's designation of the organization
that provides an essential element of the proceeding.
That review, however, can be limited. Not all aspects of the
designation must be considered in the criminal case but only
whether the Secretary was acting within his statutory and constitutional authority in making the designation.
V.

REMEDYING THE DUE PROCESS VIOLATIONS

A.

The Remedy

The remedy is simple. The statutory scheme should be
amended to furnish a constitutionally sufficient notice to all organizations when the Secretary determines that a designation may be
imminent. These organizations should then be afforded a reasonable but limited time for a meaningful hearing.
Proper governmental interests would not be harmed by these
changes. While the government might be concerned that an organization's assets that would be frozen after a designation will be spirited away when notice is given, a temporary freezing of the assets
pending the hearing's outcome can occur consistently with the
Constitution.' 19 Whatever foreign relations fallout that would
come for a pre-designation notice and hearing would come anyway
from the actual designation, and with revised procedures the government might get a foreign relations benefit from proceeding
more fairly.
119.

See, e.g., supra notes 23-24 and accompanying text.
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While many organizations given notice will not seek the hearing, more organizations than now may challenge their designations
because they will not have to reveal American assets and operations
to have a hearing. If there are designations that should be judicially
overturned, that is more likely to happen.
Finally, the revised procedures should lead to Section 2339B
prosecutions that will not violate due process. Section 2339B
should be a valuable tool toward achieving the important societal
goal of eliminating the funding of terrorist organizations. With the
present scheme, all Section 2339B convictions are suspect and some
may be unconstitutional. The convictions now can be sustained
only by eroding due process, individual rights, and separation of
power. This is not necessary. Simple revisions of the statutory
scheme can remove these problems.
B.

The Review's Limited Subject Matter

If the statutory scheme is not amended, then the solution is to
permit challenges in the criminal cases to designations made in violation of due process. Supreme Court cases granting judicial review
not statutorily authorized in the criminal case of an administrative
order limit that review to the basic question of whether the administrative agency was acting within the authorized power granted to it
by Congress and the Constitution. Estep limited the review to
whether the draft board had jurisdiction to issue the order; Mendoza-Lopez to whether the deportation order was issued in violation
of due process;1 20 Adamo to whether the regulation was an "emission standard;" Touby granted review of the administrative order to
ascertain whether the will of Congress had been obeyed. Estep,
120.
Language read in isolation in Mendoza-Lopez could support a right to a broader
review. The Court stated, "Persons charged with crime are entitled to have the factual
and legal determinations upon which convictions are based subject to the scrutiny of an
impartial judicial officer." 481 U.S. at 841. The Court elsewhere in the opinion indicated that it was not reviewing the issue of whether the Immigration Judge in ordering
the deportation had correctly weighed evidence. Instead the due process violation consisted of the Immigration Judge not explaining adequately to the aliens their right to
seek suspension of the order or their right to appeal. The Court held, "[A] collateral
challenge to use of a deportation proceeding as an element of a criminal offense must
be permitted where the deportation proceeding effectively eliminates the right of the
alien to obtain judicial review...." Id. at 839. What was reviewable was not the propriety of the order but "the legitimacy of an adjudicative order. . . ." Id. at 839 n.15.
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Adamo, and Touby, although phrasing the subject matter of the review differently, all really limited it to the same question - did the
administrative agency exceed its statutory mandate? An agency
would be acting outside its congressionally-granted role if it acted
withoutjurisdiction, if it issued a regulation of a different kind from
that authorized by Congress, or if it did not act within the standards
set as its boundaries by Congress. t2 1 Mendoza-Lopez allowed review
of the even more basic but related question - did the administrative
agency exceed its constitutionally-authorized mandate? 22
The cases are consistent in allowing review of whether the
agency or administrator had the basic authority to take the action
creating the element of the prosecution. Such a review does not
evaluate the correctness of the administrative action.1 2 3 If the order was made within the lawful authority granted by Congress and
the Constitution, the criminal court cannot review it. Estep stressed
this when it said:
The provision making the decisions of the local boards
'final' means to us that Congress chose not to give administrative action under this Act the customary scope ofjudicial review which obtains under other statutes. It means
that the courts are not to weigh the evidence to determine whether the classification made by the local boards
121.
Touby relied on Skinner v. Mid-America Pipeline Co., 490 U.S. 212, 218 (1989),
for the proposition that "so long as Congress provides an administrative agency with
standards guiding its actions such that a court 'ascertain whether the will of Congress
has been obeyed' no delegation of legislative authority trenching on the principles of
separation of powers has occurred." 490 U.S. 212, 218-19 (1989) (quoting Mistretta v.
United States, 488 U.S. 361, 379 (1989)); see Alexander, supra note 72 at 628 ("one of
the reasons for requiring Congress to articulate some 'intelligible principle' when delegating authority is to give the courts some basis on which to judge whether an agency
has exceeded its statutory mandate.").
122.
Sattardistinguished Touby because the Sattar defendants were not relying on a
nondelegation argument: "[T]he issue in Touby was whether there was sufficient judicial review to comply with the nondelegation doctrine such that Congressional standards were followed. The defendants here have not relied on any argument based on
an impermissible delegation of powers." 272 F. Supp. 2d at 367. If there had been an
impermissible delegation, then the administrator would not have had the constitutional
authority to create the element of the crime. A Section 2339B defendant makes the
same basic claim, that is, that the Secretary does not have the constitutional authority to
create an element of the prosecution in violation the Constitution.
123. Cf Sattar, 272 F. Supp. 2d at 367 ("The element of the offense is ... not the
correctness of the determination . . ." of a designation.).
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was justified. The decisions made by the local boards
are final even
made in conformity with the regulations
1 24
though they may be erroneous.
Adamo in requiring review in a criminal case of whether an
EPA regulation was an emission standard stressed that
[t]he narrow inquiry to be addressed by the court in a
criminal prosecution is not whether the Administrator
has complied with appropriate procedures in promulgating the regulation in question, or whether the particular
regulation is arbitrary, capricious, or supported by the administrative record. Nor is the court to pursue any of the
other familiar inquiries which arise in the course of an
administrative review proceeding. The question is only
whether the regulation which the defendant is alleged to
have violated is on its face an 'emission standard' within
the broad limits of the congressional meaning of that
1 25

term.

The Section 2339B defendant cannot have review of whether
the Secretary of State properly weighed the statutory factors in making a designation. Even if the designation were erroneous, it cannot be challenged in the criminal case. But just as the defendants
in Estep, Mendoza-Lopez, Adamo, and Touby could have judicial review
of whether the administrative predicate was made without statutory
or constitutional authority, a Section 2339B defendant has the right
of judicial review of whether the administrative action that created
an essential element in his prosecution violated the Constitution.
With review limited as it can be, the basics of the statutory review scheme remain intact. That core, as Sattar summarized it, is
that
Congress intended for judicial review of FTO designations to occur solely within the Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia within 30 days of publication in the
Federal Register ....

Centralized review under the statute

is important because FfO designations have significant
foreign relations implications that Congress could reason124.
125.

327 U.S. at 122-23; accord Dickinson v. United States, 346 U.S. 389 (1953).
434 U.S. at 285.
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ably conclude should be resolved by a court that is able to
12 6
develop a unified body of relevant law.
The limited review required in Section 2339B prosecutions
leaves this centralized review intact. The result is much like in
Adamo where the statutory scheme prohibited review in a criminal
case and only authorized review within thirty days in the D.C. Circuit. In upholding the trial court's review of whether the regulation was an emission standard, the Supreme Court stated that the
trial "court did not undermine the twin congressional purposes of
insuring that the substantive provisions of the standards would be
uniformly applied and interpreted and that the circumstances of its
adoption would be quickly reviewed by a single court intimately familiar with administrative procedures. The District Court did not
presume to judge the wisdom of the regulation or to consider the
adequacy of the procedures which led to its promulgation, but
merely concluded that it was not an emission standard." 127
Similarly in a Section 2339B prosecution, centralized review
will remain in the D.C. Circuit of all issues concerning designations
except whether the required procedures for creating an element of
the crime violate the Constitution. The required due process review will not implicate foreign relation concerns any more than
other due process evaluations. Courts, of course, should not intrude on the foreign relations operations and choices of the political branches because the Constitution does not give the judiciary
this authority. The Constitution, however, gives the courts authority to evaluate whether a governmental action complies with due
process, and the law controlling these assessments is not the law
affecting foreign relations. A due process analysis does not review
foreign relations choices but only weighs general constitutional
principles that apply in a wide variety of situations. All courts, not
just the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, are competent to determine whether a due process violation has occurred. It
is the kind of decision courts regularly make, and individual rights,
due process, and the preservation of separation of powers require
the courts in Section 2339B proceedings to determine whether an
126.
127.

272 F. Supp. 2d at 367.
Adamo, 434 U.S. at 284.
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element of the prosecution has been created in violation of the
Constitution.
C.

The Difficulties of Proving the Due Process Violations

A due process violation will not be easy to establish even if one
has occurred. The accused has the burden of showing that the law
being used for the prosecution is unconstitutional. 128 If the organization has sought judicial review of the designation, there should
be few proof problems. The organization will presumably have
marshaled the evidence showing the necessary presence, and this
could be relied on in the criminal prosecution. On the other hand,
29
if the organization has not sought the review, a likely situation,
the accused would have to prove the organization's necessary presence in the United States to establish a due process violation, and
the accused is unlikely to have access to the information demonstrating that presence.
Because an accused may not have the information establishing
a due process violation even when one has occurred, and the organization with the information may avoid review and not marshal the
information, it is entirely possible for a Section 2339B prosecution
to be in fact illegal but impossible for the accused to prove it. The
present statutory scheme can easily lead to convictions and punishments that look valid only because of hidden unconstitutionalities.
VI.

CONCLUSION

Section 2339B makes it a crime to give material support or resources to groups designated foreign terrorist organizations by the
Secretary of State. Section 1189's designation process, however,
can create an element of the crime in violation of due process. If
so, the resulting prosecution violates the Constitution, and the accused is entitled to judicial review of that unconstitutionality. The
statutory scheme should be changed to eliminate the possibility of
128.

See WAYNE R. LAFAvE, CRIMINAL LAw 61 (3rd ed. 2000) ("It has been held that

the burden of proving facts showing unconstitutionality is upon the defendant, partially
at least because there is a presumption of validity and a reluctance on the part of courts
to strike down legislation as unconstitutional.").
See supra text accompanying note 118.
129.

172
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unconstitutional designations by affording organizations notice of
an imminent designation and a meaningful hearing to contest the
designation.

